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INTRODUCTION
In July 2017, Ghassan and Nadia Alasaad, two law-abiding American 
citizens, traveled to Québec on a family vacation.1 After spending three 
weeks in Canada, the Alasaads and their daughters boarded a plane to
return to their home in Massachusetts.2 While crossing the border from
Canada to Vermont, a Customs and Border Protection (CBP) agent
informed the Alasaad family that they were being detained because the
agent “simply felt like ordering a secondary inspection.”3 Subsequently,
the agent escorted the Alasaad family to an inspection room and
confiscated their smartphones.4 
After the Alasaads waited for hours in the inspection room, the agent
ordered Mrs. Alasaad to provide the passcode to her smartphone.5 Mrs.
Alasaad refused to comply with the agent’s demand and requested that a
female agent conduct the search.6 The agent informed the Alasaads that a
female agent would not be available to search the phone for hours.7 Unable
1. Alasaad v. Nielson, No. 17-CV-11730-DJC, 2018 WL 2170323, at *5 (D. 
Mass. May 19, 2018).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Mrs. Alasaad’s smartphone contained photos of her without her
headscarf. It is against Mrs. Alasaad’s religious beliefs to allow men to view those 
images. Id.
7. Id.
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2032019] COMMENT
to wait longer because their daughter was ill, the Alasaads departed the
airport without their phones and did not receive them until 15 days later.8 
Additionally, when Mr. Alasaad attempted to access his daughter’s
graduation video weeks after the search, his phone displayed the message,
“Sorry, this media file doesn’t exist on your internal storage.”9 The error
message had never appeared on Mr. Alasaad’s phone before the CBP’s
forensic search at the border.10 
For decades, the government has subjected individuals crossing the
United States borders to a minimally intrusive search based on the
sovereign’s compelling interest in monitoring its borders.11 Americans’
tolerance for border searches, however, is declining as forensic technology
increasingly threatens border entrants’ privacy interests.12 As technology
evolves, digital forensic searches at the border are no longer “minimally”
intrusive.13 The CBP’s search of the Alasaads’ cell phones, for example, was
not minimally intrusive.14 Instead, it was excessively intrusive.15 Although 
some courts maintain the constitutionality of the current use of forensic
technology at the border, others reason that digital forensic searches clearly
violate the prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures under the
United States Constitution’s Fourth Amendment.16 The inconsistent law
involving digital border searches has provoked fear at the border for citizens
such as the Alasaads.17 
8. Id.
9. Alasaad v. Nielson: Plaintiffs’ Stories, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND.
(Sept. 13, 2017), https://www.eff.org/pages/alasaad-vs-duke-bios [https://perma
.cc/KL46-C5VY]. 
10. Alasaad, 2018 WL 2170323, at *5.
11. Ric Simmons, Searching for Terrorists: Why Public Safety Is Not a 
Special Need, 59 DUKEL.J. 843, 846 (2010); YULE KIM, CONG. RESEARCHSERV.,
RL31826, PROTECTING THE U.S. PERIMETER: BORDER SEARCHES UNDER THE
FOURTH AMENDMENT 1 (2009).
12. The scope and duration of a forensic search are far greater than other
searches. See, e.g., United States v. Saboonchi, 990 F. Supp. 2d 536, 560–61 
(2014) (describing the difference between forensic searches and manual
searches). The use of forensic technology to conduct searches threatens intimate
privacy interests. See, e.g., id.
13. See Alasaad, 2018 WL 2170323, at *5.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. See United States v. Kolsuz, 890 F.3d 133 (4th Cir. 2018); United States
v. Touset, 890 F.3d 1227 (11th Cir. 2018).
17. See Alasaad, 2018 WL 2170323, at *5.
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204 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80
The Fourth Amendment seeks to protect citizens from unreasonable
searches and seizures.18 Specifically, the Fourth Amendment seeks to 
safeguard individuals’ privacy interests and intercept wrongful intrusions by 
the government.19 Lawmakers and courts have established legal safeguards
such as search warrants to ensure that government officers interfere with
individuals’ Fourth Amendment rights only under limited circumstances
and through specific methods. For example, federal courts only permit 
warrantless and suspicionless searches if law enforcement’s conduct is
reasonable under the circumstances.20 Accordingly, reasonableness
becomes a critical factor in determining a digital forensic search’s
constitutionality.21 Certain criteria used to evaluate the reasonableness of
digital forensic searches, however, are inconsistent and conflicting across
jurisdictions.22 Due to conflicts in federal caselaw, the standard of proof
the government must meet to conduct reasonable warrantless forensic
searches varies based on where a person crosses the border.23 For example,
a CBP agent in Virginia or California must have reasonable suspicion of
criminal activity to seize and forensically search an individual’s device.24 
A CBP agent in Georgia, however, may seize and forensically search an
individual’s device without any suspicion or justification.25 This disparity
leaves Americans uncertain of their rights at the border and increases
national tension involving the government’s reach into individuals’ private
lives.26 
18. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
19. Id.
20. See, e.g., United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112 (2001); Griffin v.
Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868 (1987); United States v. Smith, 273 F.3d 629 (2001).
21. See KIM, supra note 11, at 1.
22. See generally United States v. Kolsuz, 890 F.3d 133 (4th Cir. 2018)
(requiring border agents have reasonable suspicion to conduct digital forensic
searches in the Fourth Circuit because of the privacy interests at stake); United
States v. Touset, 890 F.3d 1227 (11th Cir. 2018) (finding border agents do not
need any suspicion to conduct a digital forensic search).
23. Kelly T. Currie et al., International Trade Law: Reasonable Suspicion 
Required for Forensic Searches of Electronic Devices at the Border, CROWELL
MORNING (May 25, 2018), https://www.cmtradelaw.com/2018/05/no-reasonable-
suspicion-required-for-forensic-searches-of-electronic-devices-at-the-border/ [https:/
/perma.cc/9ZQ2-TBZX].
24. See generally United States v. Cotterman, 709 F.3d 952, 958 (9th Cir.
2013); Kolsuz, 890 F.3d at 136.
25. See generally Touset, 890 F.3d at 1227 (holding border agents may
conduct a digital forensic search without suspicion).
26. Charlie Savage & Ron Nixon, Privacy Complaints Mount Over Phone
Searches at U.S. Border Since 2011, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 22, 2017), https://www.ny
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2052019] COMMENT
Statistics from the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”)
confirm a rapid increase in warrantless border searches of electronic
devices.27 In 2017, the CBP conducted 60% more searches of electronic
devices than in 2016, searching approximately 30,200 devices at the
border—28 nearly tripling the annual number of searches since 2015.29 The
public has noticed the impact of the increase in digital searches.30 The
Knight First Amendment Institute at Columbia University31 recently
obtained complaints submitted to the DHS by travelers whose electronic
devices were searched at the border.32 These complaints suggested digital 
searches severely violated travelers’ subjective sense of privacy and 
further emphasized the inconvenience the searches imposed on the
travelers’ lives and plans.33 
Notwithstanding the sharp increase in digital border searches, the
Eleventh Circuit ruled in May 2018 that CBP agents do not need any
times.com/2017/12/22/us/politics/us-border-privacy-phone-searches.html [https:
//perma.cc/6ZC2-8TES]. The debate over digital privacy and national security
continues. Privacy advocates argue that the government uses technology to infringe
on individual privacy. Cell Phone Privacy, ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/issues/
privacy-technology/location-tracking/cell-phone-privacy [https://perma.cc/N9BV-
RE8N] (last visited Oct. 27, 2018). Advocates for digital border searches, however,
assert that device searches are necessary to gather intelligence and advance pre-
existing criminal investigations. Matthew S. Schwartz, ACLU: Border Searches
Violate Constitution When They Search Electronic Devices, NPR (May 2, 2019,
5:10 AM), https://www.npr.org/2019/05/02/719337356/aclu-border-agents-violate-
constitution-when-they-search-electronic-devices [https://perma.cc/EY5L-9D9N].
27. Currie et al., supra note 23. 
28. Alexis E. Dannerman & Gina LaMonica, Courts Continue to Grapple with
Border Searches of Electronic Devices: Fourth Circuit Rules Forensic Searches
Require Individualized Suspicion, PERKINSCOIE (May 23, 2018), https://www.
whitecollarbriefly.com/2018/05/23/courts-continue-to-grapple-with-border-search
es-of-electronic-devices-fourth-circuit-rules-forensic-searches-require-individual
ized-suspicion/ [https://perma.cc/8JA6-9JNW].
29. Savage & Nixon, supra note 26.
30. Defending the Freedoms of Speech and the Press in the Digital Age:
About the Knight Institute, KNIGHT FIRST AMEND. INST., https://knight
columbia.org/content/about-knight-institute [https://perma.cc/UJ24-YLV7] (last
visited Oct. 12, 2018).
31. Columbia University established the Knight First Amendment Institute in
2016 to “safeguard free expression in the landscape of the digital age.” Id. The 
Institute focuses on threats to Constitutional protections evolving from
technology. Id.
32. Savage & Nixon, supra note 26.
33. Id. 
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206 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80
suspicion to conduct digital forensic searches at the border.34 The Eleventh 
Circuit’s decision impacts millions of travelers, citizens, and noncitizens
crossing the border with highly sensitive or confidential information.35 
Furthermore, its decision indirectly impacts non-travelers.36 Confidential
information, images, phone numbers, and other details of an individual’s 
life may be stored on a traveling friend or relative’s electronic devices.37 
Consequently, the government can access a non-traveler’s private
information while forensically searching a traveler’s digital device.38 
Courts’ improper application of the Fourth Amendment analysis involving 
digital forensic searches has frustrated the Fourth Amendment’s
reasonableness standard as it applies to the border.39 Accordingly, the
United States needs a regulated approach to analyze the reasonableness of
digital forensic searches at the border to clarify the law and uniformly
protect travelers’ Fourth Amendment rights. 
A multi-factor reasonableness test is the best solution to the nation’s
inconsistent law currently governing digital forensic searches at the
border.40 The test would provide courts with variables to weigh when
determining the reasonableness of digital forensic searches at the border.41 
First, courts will use several factors to analyze the duration and procedure
of the suspicionless search at issue.42 Next, courts will identify the type,
degree, and imminence of harm the state was trying to prevent when
conducting the suspicionless search.43 If the forensic search at the border
was unnecessary to prevent the type of harm at stake, the search should be
deemed less reasonable.44 Finally, courts must consider the impact that 
upholding a suspicionless digital forensic search at the border will have on
the sovereign’s interest in preventing intentional discrimination at the
34. United States v. Touset, 890 F.3d 1227 (11th Cir. 2018).
35. Grayson Clary, Summary: Circuit Split on Device Searches at the Border 
in U.S. v. Touset, LAWFARE (May 30, 2018, 8:00 AM), https://www.lawfareblog
.com/summary-circuit-split-device-searches-border-us-v-touset [https://perma.cc
/9BXA-524T]. 
36. See generally United States v. Saboonchi, 990 F. Supp. 2d 536, 547 (D.
Md. 2014).
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Dannerman & LaMonica, supra note 28.
40. See infra Part IV.
41. See infra Part IV.
42. See infra Part III.
43. See infra Part III.
44. See Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989) (holding
suspicionless drug tests of railroad operators was necessary and reasonable to
protect the public because the harms at stake were imminent).
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2072019] COMMENT
border and CBP resource depletion.45 The preceding test equips courts
with a principled basis to monitor and scrutinize suspicionless forensic
searches of electronic devices at the border. 
Part I of this Comment discusses border searches in general and
addresses the purpose of previous laws. Part II considers the circuit split
and details the conflicting law regarding forensic searches of electronic
devices at the border. Part III analyzes caselaw regarding the duration and
procedure of suspicionless searches and seizures. Additionally, this
Comment addresses the factors courts have considered in judging the
reasonableness of a suspicionless search or seizure. Finally, Part IV
proposes a multi-factor reasonableness test to evaluate forensic searches
of electronic devices at the border.
I. THE NUTS AND BOLTS OF DIGITAL FORENSIC SEARCHES
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides
that “the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, 
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue but upon probable cause . . . .”46 Since 
its ratification, the Fourth Amendment has been a critical pillar of
American democracy because it protects individuals from arbitrary
government intrusion.47 Federal courts have consistently confronted 
Fourth Amendment issues in the face of societal change and have applied
the Fourth Amendment protections in accordance with the evolving
American culture.48 
The Fourth Amendment protects individuals from government action
that constitutes an unreasonable search or seizure.49 To evaluate the
constitutionality of a search or seizure, courts must initially answer the
45. See Janfeshan v. United States Customs & Border Prot., No. 16-CV-
6915(ARR)(LB), 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 151058, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 21, 2017)
(holding a search unreasonable because agents intentionally discriminated against
the border entrant).
46. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
47. Barry Friedman & Orin Kerr, The Fourth Amendment, NAT’L CONST.
CTR. (Sep. 3, 2018, 7:12 PM), https://constitutioncenter.org/interactive-
constitution/amendments/amendment-iv [https://perma.cc/N6Z5-JLZK].
48. See generally Tom McInnis, The Changing Definition of Search or
Seizure, 11 INSIGHTS ON L. & SOC’Y (No. 2) 10 (2011), https://www.american
bar.org/content/dam/aba/images/public_education/presentations/ChangingDefini 
tionsofSearch.pdf [https://perma.cc/7PSY-44MW] (describing how the Fourth
Amendment has been interpreted differently at different points in history).
49. KIM, supra note 11, at 1.
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208 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80
threshold question of whether a search or seizure occurred.50 A search
takes place when a government agent infringes on someone’s reasonable
expectation of privacy or commits an investigatory trespass.51 Further, a 
seizure of an object occurs when a government agent interferes with a
person’s possessory interest in that object.52 Once a court concludes that a
search or seizure occurred, it must decide two separate questions:
(1) whether the government agent had the requisite level of justification
for conducting the search or seizure and (2) whether the government
conducted the search or seizure in a reasonable manner.53 Indeed, the
United States Supreme Court dictated that “the touchstone of the Fourth 
Amendment is reasonableness.”54 To evaluate a search’s reasonableness,
courts examine the totality of circumstances surrounding a search and
balance the government’s interests against an individual’s interests.55 
Courts recognize that the government violates the Fourth Amendment
when a citizen’s legitimate expectation of privacy significantly outweighs
the government’s interest in the search or seizure.56 
Generally, the government does not have the requisite level of
justification for conducting a search under the Fourth Amendment unless 
a warrant accompanies the search.57 State and federal courts interpret the
Fourth Amendment to impose a “presumptive warrant requirement” on all 
searches and seizures.58 Before a judge can issue a warrant for a search or
seizure, the government official must demonstrate probable cause that the
50. Id.
51. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967); United States v. Jones, 565
U.S. 400 (2012). An investigatory trespass occurs when a government agent
trespasses in an effort to obtain evidence for a criminal prosecution without a
warrant or probable cause. See, e.g., Jones, 565 U.S. 400.
52. 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE
FOURTH AMENDMENT § 2.1 (5th ed. 2018).
53. See, e.g., United States v. Guzman-Padilla, 573 F.3d 865, 876 (9th Cir.
2009). The first element of the reasonableness inquiry concerns the level of
suspicion that government agents must possess to justify their intrusions. Id. The 
required level of suspicion varies depending on the type of search or seizure. At
the border, for example, government agents may conduct certain searches or
seizures without any suspicion. Id.
54. See, e.g., Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006) (“[T]he
ultimate touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is ‘reasonableness’ . . . .”).
55. KIM, supra note 11, at 6.
56. Id.
57. Id. A warrant is executed when a judge signs an order authorizing law
enforcement to search or seize certain persons or property. See Warrant, BLACK’S 
LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
58. KIM, supra note 11, at 1.
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2092019] COMMENT
search will reveal evidence of a crime.59 An officer demonstrates probable
cause when “there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a
crime will be found in a specified place.”60 The Supreme Court, however,
has recognized different situations where the warrant requirement does not
apply, creating several specific exceptions to the Fourth Amendment.61 
Under these exceptions, a warrantless search may be justified when the
government has probable cause, reasonable suspicion,62 or even no
suspicion.63 Nonetheless, even if the search does not require a warrant, it
must be reasonable under the totality of circumstances.64 
A. The Border Search Exception to the Fourth Amendment
Many searches fall under certain judicially created exceptions to the
warrant requirement.65 The border search exception is a long-recognized
exception that allows CBP to search and seize persons and property
crossing the border without a warrant.66 Congress and courts have deemed
59. Id.
60. United States v. Grubbs, 547 U.S. 90, 95 (2006) (quoting Illinois v. Gates,
462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983)). Probable cause is a relatively low standard to meet. 
See generally id.
61. KIM, supra note 11, at 1.
62. Reasonable suspicion is “a particularized and objective basis for
suspecting the particular person” of wrongdoing. United States v. Montoya de
Hernandez, 473 U.S. 541, 541 (1985) (citing United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S.
411, 417 (1981)).
63. KIM, supra note 11, at 1. Courts presume that agents need a warrant and 
probable cause unless an exception to the warrant requirement applies. For example,
searches incident to arrest exempt government agents from the requirements of
warrants, probable cause, and reasonable suspicion. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 
(1968). Additionally, short detentions for traffic violations do not require a warrant
or probable cause. SeeWhren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996).
64. See Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. 435 (2013). The question of whether the
government’s search or seizure is justified at the outset is different than whether the
search or seizure is reasonably conducted. To illustrate, a government agent could
obtain a search warrant supported by probable cause, thus satisfying the justification 
prong of the Fourth Amendment analysis. If the agent kicks down the door to a
home in order to conduct the search, however, the agent’s search may be considered
unreasonable. See, e.g., Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385 (1997).
65. Major exceptions to the warrant requirement include consent, exigent
circumstances, searches incident to arrests, the “plain view” doctrine, and Terry
stops. Exceptions to the Warrant Requirement, JUSTIA, https://www.justia.com/
criminal/procedure/warrant-requirement/ [https://perma.cc/5MAJ-PW8M] (last
visited Oct. 25, 2018).
66. KIM, supra note 11, at 7.
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210 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80
these searches inherently reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.67 As 
statutorily intended and judicially recognized,68 the border search 
exception promotes Congress’s constitutional authority to control
commerce and furthers the sovereign’s interest in protecting itself from
terrorist activities and contraband.69 At the border, the government’s
interest in national self-protection outweighs an individual’s privacy
interests.70 
The border search exception applies to all people or items entering or
leaving the United States at the border or a functional equivalent of the
border.71 Generally, the functional equivalent of the border is “the first
practical detention point after a border crossing or the final port-of-
entry.”72 Caselaw suggests that the following constitute the functional
equivalent of a border: international airports receiving nonstop flights
from foreign nations, domestic airports receiving international flights,
landing-rights airports,73 airstrips, automobile checkpoints where all
international traffic passes through ports, vessels in inland waters, and
territorial waters.74 Limits to the functional equivalent of a border do exist,
however, including bus depots and restaurants located 100 miles from the
international border.75 Further, courts categorize searches that occur at the
border or a functional equivalent based on the invasive nature of the
search.76 
67. See, e.g., United States v. Alfaro-Moncada, 607 F.3d 720, 728 (11th Cir.
2010).
68. See, e.g., 19 U.S.C. § 482 (2018) (allowing customs officials to conduct
searches of persons, vehicles, and mail at the border without a warrant); 8 U.S.C.
§ 1357 (2018) (giving immigration officers broad powers to question and detain
persons without a warrant at the border).
69. KIM, supra note 11, at 7.
70. Id.
71. R.V. Seep, What Constitutes Functional Equivalent of Border for
Purpose of Border Exception to Requirements of Fourth Amendment, 94 A.L.R.
FED. 372 (Westlaw 2018).
72. KIM, supra note 11, at 7.
73. Seep, supra note 71, at § 2[a] (defining a landing-rights airport as “an
airport at which permission to land may be granted by the appropriate Customs
officer with the concurrence of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, the
Public Health Service, and the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service of the
Department of Agriculture, such permission being necessary before an aircraft
may land at an airport not designated as an international airport”).
74. Seep, supra note 71.
75. See United States v. Barbera, 514 F.2d 294 (1975); Blackie’s House of
Beef, Inc. v. Castillo, 467 F. Supp. 170 (1978).
76. KIM, supra note 11, at 9.
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2112019] COMMENT
B. Categories of Searches at the Border
Border searches usually fall into two judicially created categories:
routine searches and non-routine searches.77 Further, CBP agents may 
conduct either a manual search or a forensic search of digital devices at
the border.78 The border search exception only applies to border searches
that fall within certain spheres of these judicially created categories.
1. Routine versus Non-Routine Searches at the Border
Traditionally, courts analyzed border searches based on whether the 
searches were routine or non-routine.79 A routine border search is “a search
that does not pose a serious invasion of privacy or offend the average
traveler.”80 Congress permits government officials to conduct routine
searches of persons and objects at the border without reasonable suspicion,
probable cause, or a warrant.81 A CBP agent may conduct a routine search 
on, for example, a border entrant’s purse, suitcase, wallet, or jacket.82 
Additionally, a routine search may include the use of drug-sniffing dogs83 
or a limited pat-down to search for contraband or weapons.84 Routine
searches—following the same logic as the border search exception—are 
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment because the government’s
national security interest significantly outweighs an individual’s interest
in privacy when the individual enters the United States.85 
To distinguish between routine and non-routine border searches,
courts focus on the degree of intrusion on an individual’s legitimate
expectations of privacy.86 Courts have articulated several factors to
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. United States v. Johnson, 991 F.2d 1287, 1291 (7th Cir. 1993).
81. KIM, supra note 11, at 9.
82. Johnson, 991 F.2d at 1291.
83. United States v. Kelly, 302 F.3d 291, 294–95 (5th Cir. 2002) (holding 
that a dog sniff at the border constitutes a routine border search).
84. See, e.g., United States v. Beras, 183 F.3d 22, 24 (1st Cir. 1999) (holding
that the patdown of an international traveler’s legs was a routine border search).
85. See Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 154 (1925); Gary N. Jacobs,
Border Searches and the Fourth Amendment, 77 YALE L.J. 1007, 1012 (1968) 
(explaining that border entrants have a lessened reasonable expectation of privacy
at the border because they are put on notice when approaching a border that a
search of their person or belongings may be imminent).
86. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (describing a legitimate 
expectation of privacy as one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable);
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212 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80
consider when determining how to categorize a border search: (1) whether
the search exposes intimate body parts; (2) whether the CBP agent made
physical contact with the suspect during the search; (3) whether the agent
used force; (4) whether the search caused pain or danger; (5) the manner
in which the agent conducted the search; and (6) whether the search 
violated the suspect’s reasonable expectation of privacy.87 
In contrast, non-routine searches include highly intrusive searches that
implicate significant dignity and privacy interests, as well as destructive
searches of property and searches carried out in particularly offensive
manners.88 Clearly, non-routine searches pose a great intrusion of
privacy.89 For example, courts have found non-routine searches include
prolonged detentions, strip searches, body cavity searches, and some x-ray 
examinations.90 Given their intrusive nature, non-routine searches require
CBP agents to have reasonable suspicion of wrongdoing.91 Generally, the
intrusion of a non-routine search must be “reasonably related in scope to
the circumstances which justified it initially.”92 As society becomes more
dependent on technology, courts have struggled with categorizing digital
border searches as routine or non-routine. 
2. Manual versus Forensic Searches at the Border
Considering the exceedingly different techniques involved, CBP 
agents must make the important distinction between manual and forensic
searches when conducting a border search.93 A manual search of an
electronic device at the border is less intrusive than a forensic search.94 
During a manual search, CBP agents may scroll through an electronic
Johnson, 991 F.2d at 1291 (citing United States v. Braks, 842 F.2d 509, 511–12 
(1st Cir. 1988)).
87. United States v. Braks, 842 F.2d 509, 511–12 (1st Cir. 1988).
88. United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149, 154 (2004).
89. KIM, supra note 11, at 10.
90. Id.
91. Reasonable suspicion is “a particularized and objective basis for
suspecting the particular person” of wrongdoing. See United States v. Montoya
de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 541, 541 (1985) (citing United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S.
411, 417 (1981)).
92. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. at 542.
93. United States v. Saboonchi, 990 F. Supp. 2d 536, 547 (D. Md. 2014).
94. See, e.g., United States v. Arnold, 533 F.3d 1003, 1008 (9th Cir. 2008)
(“reasonable suspicion is not needed for customs officials to search a laptop or
other personal electronic storage device at the border”); United States v. Bunty,
617 F. Supp. 2d 359, 365 (E.D. Pa. 2008) (holding that files on defendant’s floppy
disk permissible as part of suspicionless border search).
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2132019] COMMENT
device’s contents or use search functions to view specific files.95 Courts
have favorably described these manual searches as conventional
inspections of specific files on devices similar to searches of physical
papers or suitcases.96 Further, if a device is password-protected, federal
law allows CBP officials to demand technical assistance, including
translation or decryption. Indeed, travelers who refuse to give passwords
for their devices could be detained for longer periods of time and have
their bags searched more intrusively.97 
Opposed to physical papers or suitcases, however, a forensic search is 
more invasive because it “involves an exhaustive search of [the device’s]
entire hard drive.”98 A forensic analyst begins a forensic search by creating
an exact copy or image of the device.99 The analyst then uses specialized 
software to search the data obtained from the electronic device.100 This
obtained information includes the full contents of the hard drive, the
properties of the individual files, and deleted files.101 Access to the data 
obtained from the device allows for the search of massive amounts of
information that a CBP official could never access alone through a manual
search.102 Consequently, forensic searches may take weeks or even 
months.
Naturally, the revolutionary technology used to forensically search a 
border entrant’s device has the potential to reveal sensitive and private
information about an individual.103 These searches can gather emails, text
messages, financial transactions, computer documents, and internet
95. Saboonchi, 990 F. Supp. 2d at 547.
96. Id. at 552.
97. See Cailey Rizzo, Border Patrol Can Keep Your Devices If You Refuse to
Reveal Your Password, TRAVEL & LEISURE NEWS, https://www.traveland
leisure.com/travel-news/border-patrol-updated-electronics-search-policy [https://
perma.cc/BC6U-VH3N] (last updated January 17, 2018). Currently, state court
judges disagree as to whether a criminal defendant may lawfully assert the Fifth
Amendment protection against self-incrimination as a justification for refusing to
provide law enforcement with a password. L.E. Wilson, Law Enforcement 
Professionals Need to Evaluate Digital Forensics Practices Amid Looming
Constitutional Showdown Regarding Digital Searches, ACCESSDATA (Mar. 1,
2018), https://accessdata.com/blog/law-enforcement-professionals-need-to-evalu
ate-digital-forensics-practices [https://perma.cc/UY5S-C8GQ]. 
98. Abidor v. Napolitano, 990 F. Supp. 2d 260, 270 (E.D.N.Y 2013).
99. Saboonchi, 990 F. Supp. 2d at 547.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 548.
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214 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80
histories from days or even months back for use as evidence.104 By
obtaining this information, forensic searches reduce the amount of control
individuals have over their personal data, raising privacy concerns.105 As
a result, the scope and duration of a forensic search far exceed that of a
manual search.106 Although courts agree that manual searches of electronic
devices at the border are routine and fall under the border search exception,
the question of whether forensic searches of electronic devices at the
border require an agent to have reasonable suspicion remains unanswered.
II. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT
Prior to 2018, federal courts required CBP agents to have some level
of suspicion to conduct a digital forensic search at the border.107 Circuits
are now split, however, about whether CBP agents need reasonable
suspicion to justify a forensic search of data stored on a device.108 
Consequently, courts disagree on the constitutionality of digital forensic
searches at the border.
A. Forensic Searches of Electronic Devices at the Border Require 
Reasonable Suspicion
The Ninth and Fourth Circuits require that government agents have 
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity to conduct a forensic search of
an electronic device at the border.109 Both circuits assert that forensic
searches of electronic devices at the border are non-routine and pose a
greater threat to an individual’s privacy interests than manual searches of
electronic devices at the border.110 
104. National Forensic Science Technology Center, A Simplified Guide to
Digital Evidence, http://www.forensicsciencesimplified.org/digital/DigitalEvi
dence.pdf [https://perma.cc/N8P4-KLQU] (last visited Sept. 3, 2018).
105. Saboonchi, 990 F. Supp. 2d at 547.
106. Id.
107. See generally United States v. Cotterman, 709 F.3d 952, 958 (9th Cir.
2013); United States v. Kolsuz, 890 F.3d 133, 147 (4th Cir. 2018).
108. Cotterman, 709 F.3d at 958; Kolsuz, 890 F.3d at 147; United States v.
Touset, 890 F.3d 1227, 1232 (11th Cir. 2018).
109. Cotterman, 709 F.3d at 958; Kolsuz, 890 F.3d at 136.
110. Cotterman, 709 F.3d at 958; Kolsuz, 890 F.3d at 136.
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2152019] COMMENT
1. The Ninth Circuit’s Perspective: United States v. Cotterman
In 2013, the Ninth Circuit became the first federal appellate court to 
rule on the constitutionality of suspicionless digital forensic border
searches. Specifically, the Ninth Circuit held inUnited States v. Cotterman
that forensic examinations of electronic devices at the border are highly
intrusive, non-routine searches that require a showing of reasonable 
suspicion under the Fourth Amendment.111 In Cotterman, federal agents
seized two laptops and three digital cameras from Howard Cotterman
while he was crossing into the United States from Mexico after a search
of the border records system, or the TECS system,112 indicated that
Cotterman was a sex offender.113 Over the course of a few days, border
agents conducted a forensic search of Cotterman’s electronic devices and
found images of child pornography.114 Cotterman sought to suppress the
images based on an unreasonable search under the Fourth Amendment.115 
In determining the reasonableness of the search, the Ninth Circuit 
balanced the government’s interest in protecting the border with
Cotterman’s privacy interests.116 Because CBP agents gather emails, text
messages, transactions, computer documents, and internet histories during
a forensic search,117 the Ninth Circuit reasoned that forensic searches
implicate constitutionally protected privacy interests. Due to the “uniquely
sensitive nature of data on electronic devices,” forensic searches require a
higher standard of proof than other property.118 Additionally, the court
compared the forensic search to a “computer strip search” and suggested
111. See Cotterman, 709 F.3d at 952.
112. The TECS system is used at border crossings and allows border officials 
to access records relevant to antiterrorism and law enforcement during searches.
When individuals cross the border, they first present themselves to a CBP agent 
upon arrival into the United States. The CBP agent obtains information directly
from the individual by using the travel documents presented by the traveler. The
CBP agent then reviews the TECS system to see if the traveler has any prior
convictions or CBP violations that indicate a need for further review. U.S.
CUSTOMS & BORDER PROT., U.S. DEP’T. OF HOMELAND SEC., PRIMARY IMPACT 
ASSESSMENT FOR THE TECS SYSTEM: CBP PRIMARY AND SECONDARY 
PROCESSING (2010).
113. Cotterman, 709 F.3d at 957–58.
114. Id. at 958.
115. Id. at 957.
116. See id.
117. A Simplified Guide to Digital Evidence, NAT’L FORENSIC SCI. TECH. CTR.,
http://www.forensicsciencesimplified.org/digital/DigitalEvidence.pdf [https://perma.
cc/U9S6-TTAT] (last visited Sept. 3, 2018).
118. Cotterman, 709 F.3d at 966.
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216 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80
in dicta that the government’s concerns about child pornography did “not
justify unfettered crime-fighting searches or an unregulated assault on
citizens’ private information.”119 Although the Ninth Circuit imposed a
reasonable suspicion standard for forensic searches of digital devices at
the border, it ultimately did not suppress the evidence collected during the
forensic search of Cotterman’s devices because Cotterman’s prior child
pornography conviction and the TECS alert gave the CBP agents
reasonable suspicion to justify the search.120 Recently, the Fourth Circuit
adopted the reasoning of the Cotterman court and stipulated that the
government needs some level of suspicion.121 
2. The Fourth Circuit’s Perspective: United States v. Kolsuz
The Fourth Circuit addressed the level of suspicion required to
conduct a forensic search of an electronic device at the border in United
States v. Kolsuz.122 In Kolsuz, CBP agents seized and conducted a forensic
search of Hamza Kolsuz’s smartphone at the Washington, D.C. airport
after finding unlicensed firearms in his luggage.123 The search lasted over
a month and generated an 896-page report that included Kolsuz’s contact
lists, call logs, messenger conversations, emails, photographs, videos,
calendar, and a history of the defendant’s physical location.124 
Subsequently, the government indicted and charged Kolsuz with 
smuggling and attempting to export firearms without a license.125 Kolsuz
sought to suppress the report from the forensic examination, arguing that
the privacy interest in his smartphone data outweighed the government’s
interest in conducting the suspicionless forensic search.126 The Fourth
Circuit used the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning from Cotterman and held that a
forensic search of a digital phone requires individualized suspicion
119. Id.
120. Cotterman, 709 F.3d at 966.
121. See United States v. Kolsuz, 890 F.3d 133 (4th Cir. 2018).
122. See id.
123. The CBP agents also searched Kolsuz’s luggage and conducted a manual 
search of his smartphone. Id. at 136.
124. Id. at 139.
125. Id.
126. Kolsuz argued that “the rationales justifying the border exception were
not implicated . . . because at the time of the search there was no prospect that
either he or his phone – both securely in government custody – would be crossing
the border.” Id. at 140. Kolsuz insisted the forensic search should be treated as a
search incident to his arrest, and, under Riley v. California, cell phones may be
searched only with a warrant based on probable cause. Id. at 137.
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2172019] COMMENT
because cell phones are “fundamentally different” from other property and
reveal information that reflects intimate details about an individual’s
political, religious, sexual, and familial associations.127 Emphasizing that
a forensic examination of an electronic device requires reasonable
suspicion of criminal conduct, the Fourth Circuit ultimately found that the
forensic search of Kolsuz’s smartphone was reasonable because the
government suspected Kolsuz’s involvement in ongoing illegal firearms
exports.128 
Furthermore, the Kolsuz court noted potential issues regarding
forensic searches at the border that may arise in the future.129 For instance,
the court considered a DHS policy adopted in January 2018 categorizing
forensic searches of electronic devices as non-routine border searches.130 
Under the policy, CBP agents must have reasonable suspicion of activity
to forensically search a digital device.131 The Fourth Circuit emphasized 
that the policy’s effect on CBP is unknown because it is not
constitutionally mandated132 and the Supreme Court has not ruled on the
legal standard for forensic searches of digital devices at the border.133 The 
Fourth Circuit also left unanswered the circumstances under which the
duration of a digital forensic search would be unreasonable.134 These
considerations emphasize the need for clarity in applying Fourth
Amendment protections to forensic searches at the border.
127. Id. at 145. The court ruled in accordance with the Supreme Court’s
decision in Riley v. California. 134 U.S. 2473 (2014). In Riley, the Court
stipulated that the search of data on smartphones is a major invasion of privacy
due to the quality and quantity of personal information stored on electronic
devices. Id. Although Riley involved a search incident to arrest, the Kolsuz Court
used the same rationale to rule that “a forensic border search of a phone must be
treated as nonroutine, permissible only on a showing of individualized suspicion.”
Kolsuz, 890 F.3d at 144.
128. Kolsuz, 890 F.3d at 148.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 147.
131. Clary, supra note 35.
132. A simple reading of a statute or policy may grant authority to the
government to search a person or property, but the statute must be interpreted with
the Fourth Amendment requirement that searches be reasonable. Federal courts
have not judicially recognized the CBP directive as constitutional. United States
v. Ickes, 393 F.3d 501, 507 (4th Cir. 2005) (distinguishing between agency
practice and constitutional requirements).
133. Kolsuz, 890 F.3d at 147.
134. Id. at 141.
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218 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80
B. Forensic Searches of Electronic Devices at the Border Do Not
Require Reasonable Suspicion
Days after the Fourth Circuit’s decision in United States v. Kolsuz, the 
Eleventh Circuit ruled in United States v. Touset that the Fourth
Amendment does not require any suspicion for forensic searches of
electronic devices at the border.135 The Touset decision extended the
border search exception to all electronic devices at the border and created
a circuit split regarding whether suspicion is necessary to forensically
search and seize devices at the border.
In Touset, border agents forensically searched Karl Touset’s
smartphone and computer in an Atlanta airport after a series of
investigations through TECS revealed his involvement with child
pornography.136 The forensic search revealed incriminating evidence, and
Touset was subsequently convicted for transporting child pornography.137 
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit rejected the Fourth and Ninth Circuit’s
reasoning in Cotterman andKolsuz. Instead, it held that courts should treat
searches on electronic devices the same as other types of property and that
courts should not require reasonable suspicion for these forensic searches
at the border. The Eleventh Circuit emphasized the historical purpose of
the border search exception and stated that the “expectation of privacy is
less at the border, and the Fourth Amendment does not guarantee the right
to travel without great inconvenience, even within our border.”138 The 
majority’s reasoning centered on the concept that “border searches are
different”139 and that the Supreme Court has never required reasonable
suspicion for searches of other types of property at the border.140 
Furthermore, the Eleventh Circuit disposed of categorizing forensic
searches as routine or non-routine because, under its reasoning, there is no
forensic search at the border that needs suspicion to be reasonable, no
matter how invasive.141 Accordingly, the Eleventh Circuit insinuated that
searches of any property at the border can be suspicionless.142 
135. United States v. Touset, 890 F.3d 1227, 1231 (11th Cir. 2018).
136. Id. at 1230.
137. Id.
138. Unlike the Fourth Circuit in Kolsuz, the Eleventh Circuit rejected this
reasoning using the Supreme Court’s holding in Riley and argued that the decision
in Riley only applies under the search-incident-to-arrest doctrine. Id. at 1235.
139. Id. at 1232.
140. Id. at 1233.
141. See id. at 1227.
142. See id.
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2192019] COMMENT
Questions regarding the reasonableness requirement of digital forensic
searches at the border loom after the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Touset. 
The current circuit split concerns the first step to the Fourth Amendment
analysis: whether the government has the requisite level of justification for
conducting a search or seizure. Courts and commentators, however, have
failed to address the reasonableness of how agents conduct a search or
seizure. This omission leaves open several unaddressed issues during a 
time at which technology is essential to society and day-to-day life. 143 
III. FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO THE REASONABLENESS OF DIGITAL
FORENSIC SEARCHES
The current circuit split overlooks the Fourth Amendment’s 
reasonableness standard.144 The Supreme Court has provided little
guidance because it has never precisely defined what constitutes a
reasonable versus an unreasonable border search.145 In a series of cases,
however, the Court has addressed certain factors related to the duration
and procedure of a border search to determine its reasonableness under the
Fourth Amendment.146 Examining these compiled factors, such as agent
diligence, public safety, and agent discretion, in the context of digital
forensic searches at the border will clarify how courts should evaluate the
reasonableness of a digital forensic search at the border.
A. Factors Contributing to the Reasonable Duration of a Forensic
Search
The length of time CBP agents detain and search a phone should
contribute to the reasonableness of a digital forensic search.147 Federal
143. Nick Ismail,Modern Technology: Advantages and Disadvantages, INFO.
AGE (Apr. 10, 2017), https://www.information-age.com/modern-technology-ad
vantages-disadvantages-123465637/ [https://perma.cc/7HN5-9JKR]. 
144. Courts’ varied opinions regarding forensic searches at the border leave
open critical questions. A resolution is important as the number of searches
conducted at the border rapidly increases. Dannerman & LaMonica, supra note 28.
145. See generally United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606 (1977).
146. See, e.g., United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983) (describing an
unnecessarily prolonged search as unreasonable because the agents failed to act
diligently); House v. Napolitano, No. 11-10852-DJC, 2012 WL 1038816 (D. 
Mass. Mar. 28, 2012) (stating the number of agents available during a search
affects the reasonableness of the search); Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 
U.S. 602 (1989) (holding imminent harm makes suspicionless searches more
reasonable).
147. See generally Place, 462 U.S. at 696.
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220 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80
courts agree that the government cannot simply seize property under its
border search power and confiscate it for weeks, months, or years.148 
Severely prolonged seizures under the border search doctrine raise serious
concerns because the duration of the search is not proportionate to the
circumstances that justified the search.149 
The border search exception essentially becomes irrelevant when time
is “unbounded” for forensic searches.150 Without time limits, border
searches stray from their purpose of preventing contraband from crossing
the border and transform into a general tool to hunt for crimes, which the 
Fourth Amendment has historically deemed unlawful.151 
In January 2018, the United States CBP addressed these concerns and
issued a directive on border searches of electronic devices.152 As
recognized in Kolsuz, the policy dictates that CBP agents may detain
devices and copies of their contents for a brief, reasonable period of time,
which ordinarily should not be longer than five days.153 The policy further
explains that supervisors may extend detentions and approve further
extensions in increments of no more than seven days.154 
Although the CBP directive places limits on the duration of a forensic
search, several issues with the language and authority of the directive leave
the reasonableness of the duration of a forensic border search unclear.155 
First, the Constitution does not mandate that courts follow the CBP
directive.156 Second, the directive grants border agents significant
discretion to delay the return of digital devices through supervisor
approval and “exigent circumstances.”157 Finally, although the directive
148. United States v. Cotterman, 637 F.3d 1068, 1070, 1082–83 (9th Cir. 2011).
149. United States v. Saboonchi, 990 F. Supp. 2d 536, 548 (D. Md. 2014)
(citing United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 542 (1985)).
150. Id. at 565 (describing a lack of time limits as “unbounded” time).
151. See City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32 (2000).
152. U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PROT., DIRECTIVE NO. 3340-049A, BORDER
SEARCH OF ELECTRONIC DEVICES (2018), https://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/
files/assets/documents/2018-Jan/CBP-Directive-3340-049A-Border-Search-of-
Electronic-Media-Compliant.pdf [https://perma.cc/RK86-6MYE].
153. See United States v. Kolsuz, 890 F.3d 133 (4th Cir. 2018); Id.
154. U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PROT., supra note 152.
155. See generally id.
156. See generally id.
157. Id. Examples of exigent circumstances include hot pursuit, a fleeing
suspect, destruction of evidence, or other situations where speed is essential.
Exigent Circumstances, in SEARCH&SEIZURECHECKLISTS (Westlaw Dec. 2018).
Recently, 10 U.S. citizens and a permanent lawful resident filed suit alleging that
the searches of their devices at the border were unreasonable. The allegations
include both manual and forensic searches. Some plaintiffs to the suit received
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2212019] COMMENT
addresses a duration for detaining the physical devices, it does not mention
whether the stipulated time also applies to the copies of the devices’
contents.158 An examination of caselaw involving the reasonable duration
of a search at the border or its functional equivalent provides valuable
insight on these emerging issues from the CBP directive.
1. Well-Established Precedent on the Reasonable Duration of Border 
Searches
Courts have long held that the duration of a search or seizure must be
reasonable.159 For example, in Illinois v. Caballes, the Supreme Court held
that a suspicionless canine sniff search during a routine traffic stop is
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment if the canine sniff search does
not “unreasonably prolong” the overall search.160 Additionally, the Court
stated in United States v. Jones that courts should consider the duration of
surveillance to determine a search’s reasonableness.161 Judges have even
signed warrants authorizing the forensic search or seizure of an electronic
device based on the stipulation that the search must be completed
quickly.162 
Beside contributing to a search’s unreasonableness, the length of time
the government holds a device can give rise to a separate Fourth
Amendment claim for the length of the seizure.163 In United States v.
Place, federal agents seized the defendant’s luggage based on reasonable
suspicion and took it to another airport to be examined.164 The defendant
alleged that seizing his luggage for 90 minutes without probable cause
violated his constitutional rights.165 The Supreme Court held that the
detention of the defendant’s luggage was unreasonable and that the agents’
their electronic devices days or even months after the initial seizure at the border.
One plaintiff still had not gotten his device back before the initiation of the case.
See Alasaad v. Nielson, No. 17-CV-11730-DJC, 2018 WL 2170323, at *5 (D. 
Mass. May 19, 2018). 
158. U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PROT., supra note 152.
159. See Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 409 (2005); United States v. Jones, 
565 U.S. 400, 407 (2012).
160. Caballes, 543 U.S. at 409.
161. Jones, 565 U.S. at 407.
162. SeeUnited States v. Brunette, 76 F. Supp. 2d 40, 42 (D. Me. 1999) (noting
that the judge permitted agents to seize and search the computers of a child
pornography suspect on the condition that the agents searched through the 
computer for no more than 30 days).
163. See generally United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 699 (1983).
164. The defendant was not detained with his luggage. Place, 462 U.S. at 699.
165. Id. at 709.
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222 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80
failure to tell the defendant where they were taking the luggage, how long
they would keep it, and how they would return it to him exacerbated the
violation.166 
In its reasoning, the Court in Place emphasized the importance of a 
search’s brevity in determining whether the seizure is reasonable under the
Fourth Amendment.167 Additionally, the Court took into account whether
the government “diligently pursued” its investigation.168 Admitting that
the agents had reasonable suspicion to seize the defendant’s luggage, the
Court nevertheless deemed the seizure unreasonable because of the
seizure’s duration and the agents’ failure to adequately inform the
defendant of the situation.169 Although Place involved a domestic search, 
meaning it did not take place at a border or functional equivalent, the Court
emphasized that analyzing the seizure’s duration is an appropriate
consideration under any Fourth Amendment reasonableness analysis.170 
Likewise, in House v. Napolitano, the United States District Court for
Massachusetts held that a warrantless border detention of the defendant’s
digital devices for 49 days was unreasonable.171 In reaching this holding,
the court upheld the defendant’s claim disputing the reasonableness of the
search’s duration, but it rejected the defendant’s argument that the CBP 
agents needed reasonable suspicion for the search.172 In its analysis, the 
court took into consideration the number of border agents available who 
were authorized to conduct the forensic search during the detention of the
devices, in addition to expert testimony suggesting that 49 days was 
unreasonable under the circumstances.173 Applying these findings, the 
court upheld the plausibility of a separate Fourth Amendment claim for
the length of the seizure.174 
Caselaw that specifically considers the reasonableness of detaining
data copies for a prolonged time remains sparse.175 The subject of a
166. Id. at 710.
167. Id. at 709.
168. Id. The agents were not attentive and persistent in conducting the search
of the defendant’s luggage. According to the Court, agents could have used
quicker methods to conduct the search. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. House v. Napolitano, No. 11-10852-DJC, 2012 WL 1038816 (D. Mass.
Mar. 28, 2012).
172. Id. at *10.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. United States v. Saboonchi, 990 F. Supp. 2d 536, 564 (D. Md. 2014).
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2232019] COMMENT
forensic search is usually an exact copy of the device’s data.176 An imaging 
machine copies the contents of the electronic device, and the device itself
is then placed into evidence storage.177 Although the CBP directive
provides a time limit for detaining an actual device, the directive also
stipulates that agents may detain the copies of information contained in the
device “for a brief, reasonable period of time to perform a thorough border
search.”178 Agents do not have to destroy any device copies until after the
forensic search is complete and they decide that there is no probable cause
to seize the device.179 By obtaining copies of the device’s contents, border
agents may unreasonably extend searches beyond the time a manual search 
at the border would have been performed, for days or weeks after the
physical device has left the agents’ control.180 The factors used to analyze 
the detention of actual devices at the border, therefore, should also be used
to evaluate the detention of data copies.
2. The Circuit Split’s Impact on Forensic Search Durations 
Courts have analyzed certain factors to determine the constitutionality
of the duration of a search at the border.181 These factors include the 
number of border agents available to complete a search, border agents’ 
diligence, expert testimony, and the information given to the individual
whose belongings are being searched.182 An examination of these
judicially created factors in the context of digital forensic searches at the
border and the effect that Cotterman, Kolsuz, and Touset could have on
these factors provides a clear and consistent legal standard to analyze the
reasonableness of a forensic search at the border.
Suspicionless searches—as opposed to searches that require
reasonable suspicion—allow government agents to search and seize an
individual’s property without any level of suspicion.183 If border agents
seize and forensically search an electronic device at the border with no
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PROT., supra note 152.
179. Id.
180. Saboonchi, 990 F. Supp. 2d at 565.
181. See United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983); House v. Napolitano,
No. 11-10852-DJC, 2012 WL 1038816 (D. Mass. Mar. 28, 2012).
182. See Place, 462 U.S. at 696; Napolitano, 2012 WL 1038816.
183. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (explaining that reasonable
suspicion requires officers to describe a specific set of circumstances that would
lead any objectively reasonable law enforcement officer to suspect the individual
is engaged in criminal activity).
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224 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80
suspicion of criminal activity, analysts could be searching mass amounts
of data for any and every kind of incriminating evidence.184 Without
guidance from courts or regulations, agents will likely detain devices
longer, making searches less reasonable under Supreme Court
precedent.185 Additionally, without a legal basis to search, federal agents
are unable to inform the individuals being searched of important details,
such as the reason for the search, what is sought in the search, and the 
duration of the search.186 These considerations reveal that there is a greater 
opportunity for a forensic search to be unconstitutional under Touset’s
ruling, which asserts that agents do not need any suspicion to conduct a
digital forensic search at the border.187 Consequently, even if CBP agents
search a device without suspicion, there is a great possibility that the
search will still be considered unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.
Under Cotterman and Kolsuz, which require reasonable suspicion to
conduct a forensic search at the border, an agent’s specific reason for
initiating a forensic search may justify the duration of the forensic
search.188 Agents can inform individuals subjected to a digital forensic
search under reasonable suspicion why the government is searching their
electronic devices and the types of evidence for which the agents are 
searching.189 Under the Court’s reasoning in Place, access to this 
information will make the forensic search more reasonable.190 Second,
narrowing a forensic search based on suspicion of a certain type of
criminal activity will clarify the probable cause requirement necessary for
agents to seize and preserve incriminating evidence from the device under
the CBP directive.191 Although the requirements in Kolsuz and Cotterman
184. Without specific facts or justification for a search, CBP agents blindly dig 
for evidence of criminal activity. See generally id.
185. Sean E. Goodison et al., Digital Evidence and the U.S. Criminal Justice 
System, Identifying Technology and Other Needs to More Effectively Acquire and
Utilize Digital Evidence, RAND CORP. (2015), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles
1/nij/grants/248770.pdf [https://perma.cc/5HAE-226X]; see Place, 462 U.S. at
696 (identifying the length of a search or seizure at the border a critical factor in
determining the reasonableness of the search).
186. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 1 (explaining that reasonable suspicion requires
officers to describe a specific set of circumstances that would lead any objectively
reasonable law enforcement officer to suspect that the individual is engaged in
criminal activity).
187. United States v. Touset, 890 F.3d 1227, 1231 (11th Cir. 2018).
188. United States v. Cotterman, 709 F.3d 952, 966 (9th Cir. 2013); United
States v. Kolsuz, 890 F.3d 133, 136 (4th Cir. 2018).
189. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 1.
190. Place, 462 U.S. at 710.
191. U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PROT., supra note 152.
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2252019] COMMENT
provide more clarity, agents are still likely to conduct unreasonably long
forensic searches under these standards because there is no policy
mandating the duration and detention of data copies, and prior cases
suggest that the government unreasonably deprives border entrants of their
electronic devices for weeks and months even when a heightened level of
justification to conduct a forensic search at the border is required.
Consequently, courts should use factors to analyze the constitutionality of
forensic border searches.192 
Regardless of the legal standard, evaluating the constitutionality of
digital forensic border searches using judicially created reasonableness
factors from previous border search cases creates a stronger likelihood that
forensic searches at the border will be reasonable.193 A reasonable forensic
search at the border would require agents to thoroughly inform travelers
why CBP agents are searching their devices and when they can expect to 
regain possession of them.194 Furthermore, agent diligence and availability
of forensic analysts to accelerate the search will heighten the
reasonableness requirement.195 Criminal defendants involved in a Fourth
Amendment claim concerning a forensic digital device search at the border
may also present expert testimony showing the duration of the border
search or seizure was unreasonable under the circumstances.196 With this
standard in place, forensic searches conducted without suspicion would be
regulated and scrutinized.197 After examining the duration of a forensic
search at the border, courts should analyze the reasonableness of the
procedure used to conduct the forensic search. 
192. See Alasaad v. Nielson, No. 17-CV-11730-DJC, 2018 WL 2170323, at
*7–8 (D. Mass. May 19, 2018) (emphasizing that the government seized one
plaintiff’s phone for two months and another plaintiff’s phone for 56 days at the 
border); Janfeshan v. United States Customs & Border Prot., No. 16-CV-
6915(ARR)(LB), 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 151058, at *2–3 (E.D.N.Y., Aug. 21,
2017) (noting the plaintiff’s phone was seized for five weeks).
193. Reasonableness is a generalized standard that courts evaluate on a case-
by-case basis. KIM, supra note 11, at 6. By using certain factors to evaluate
reasonableness that courts have recognized as critically important in a Fourth
Amendment analysis, courts’ authority will be more consistent and predictable in
the digital forensic search context. 
194. See Place, 462 U.S. at 699 (holding quality information given to a suspect
makes a border search more reasonable).
195. See Place, 462 U.S. at 696; House v. Napolitano, No. 11-10852-DJC,
2012 WL 1038816 (D. Mass. Mar. 28, 2012).
196. Napolitano, 2012 WL 1038816, at *10.
197. See generally Part III.
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226 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80
B. Factors Contributing to Reasonable Procedures for Forensic 
Searches
Recently, DHS released statistics suggesting an increase in
warrantless border searches of electronic devices.198 Consequently, it is of
rising importance for courts to assess the reasonableness of CBP procedure
to ensure that agents are appropriately and efficiently conducting forensic
searches.199 
Generally, administrative policies and procedures provide a roadmap
for day-to-day operations and promote compliance with laws and
regulations.200 Structured procedure gives authorities guidance for
decision-making and ensures efficient management of an organization’s
time and resources.201 Currently, CBP agents exercise authority and follow
procedure under federal statutes and regulations.202 CBP relies on agents’
judgment and discretion to implement and monitor forensic searches.203 
The government uses certain targeting techniques and technology to
justify a border search of entrants or their belongings.204 According to
CBP, their officers “use diverse factors to refer individuals for targeted
examinations and there are instances when [the agents’] best judgments
prove to be unfounded.”205 These systems and other targeting techniques
prevent agent bias and make the procedure of a forensic search more
198. Currie et al., supra note 23. 
199. Danneman & LaMonica, supra note 28. 
200. Matt Gasior, Following Policies and Procedures and Why It’s Important, 
POWER DMS (May 2, 2018), https://www.powerdms.com/blog/following-
policies-and-procedures-why-its-important/ [https://perma.cc/NTV7-QBV9]. 
201. Id.
202. See generally 8 U.S.C. §1225(d)(1) (2018) (giving agents authority to
board and search any vehicle believed to be bringing aliens into the country); 19
U.S.C. § 482 (2018) (allowing the search of vehicles and persons regarding
merchandise); id. § 1467 (providing for special inspection, examination, and
search); id. § 1496 (allowing the examination of baggage); id. § 1499 (sanctioning
the examination of merchandise); id. § 1581 (discussing the boarding of vessels and
searching of vehicles); id. § 1582 (regulating the search of persons and baggage);
Gretchen C.F. Shappert, The Border Search Doctrine: Warrantless Searches of
Electronic Devices after Riley v. California, USA BULLETIN (Nov. 2014),
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/usao/legacy/2014/11/14/usab6206.pdf
[https://perma.cc/SP74-2KZ9].
203. CBP Search Authority, U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PROTECTION, https://
www.cbp.gov/travel/cbp-search-authority [https://perma.cc/F47Q-2PMJ] (last
modified Jan. 5, 2018).
204. Id.
205. Id.
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2272019] COMMENT
reasonable.206 Accordingly, it is critical to articulate factors recognized by
courts that affect the reasonableness of border procedure regarding digital
forensic searches.
Permanent traffic stops are another category of border searches that
serve the sovereign’s interest in national self-protection.207 CBP agents
routinely conduct warrantless stops of vehicles near the border at fixed
checkpoints.208 Considering the national interest in protecting the 
sovereign,209 border agents do not need reasonable suspicion to stop 
vehicles traveling through the fixed checkpoints.210 Accordingly,
examining the Supreme Court’s opinions on permanent traffic stops near
the border helps identify certain factors to consider when evaluating the
reasonableness of seizing and forensically searching electronic devices at
the border.
At the border, the established procedure controlling permanent traffic 
stops limits inconvenience and intrusion on the public.211 First, a motorist
arrives at a permanent traffic stop.212 Next, the traveler drives through the 
checkpoint.213 Then, border agents may conduct either an inquiry with the
driver or a visual examination of the car.214 After agents decide that a
vehicle is secure, the driver continues through the checkpoint.215 The
Supreme Court addressed the constitutionality of this procedure in United
States v. Martinez–Fuerte.216 
206. See generally United States v. Cotterman, 709 F.3d 952, 966 (9th Cir.
2013) (holding a search reasonable because the TECS system identified the
defendant as a past offender).
207. CBP Search Authority, supra note 203.
208. What Are the Search and Seizure Rules at Permanent Interior
Immigration Checkpoints?, NOLO, https://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/
what-the-search-seizure-rules-permanent-interior-checkpoints.html [https://perm
a.cc/425H-96R4] (noting the government must use signs, cones, or flashing lights
to warn drivers of an upcoming permanent checkpoint).
209. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 555, 554 (1976).
210. See id. at 555.
211. What Are the Search and Seizure Rules at Permanent Interior
Immigration Checkpoints?, supra note 208.
212. Jesus A. Osete, The Praetorians: An Analysis of U.S. Border Patrol
Checkpoints Following Martinez-Fuerte, 93 WASH. U. L. REV. 803, 811 (2016).
213. Id.
214. Id. A visual examination of a car can be analogized to a manual search of
an electronic device; the border agent may briefly examine the exterior of the
vehicle. See generally id. A CBP agent may conduct a search of a vehicle if the
agent has probable cause or the motorist consents. Id.
215. Id.
216. See generally United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 555, 554 (1976).
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228 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80
InMartinez–Fuerte, the Court found that stopping individuals without
probable cause or reasonable suspicion at permanent vehicle checkpoints
does not violate the Fourth Amendment.217 In its reasoning, the Court
recognized that the “detention” of travelers at permanent checkpoints is
minimally intrusive because the stops are brief and involve basic
questioning.218 Additionally, because the government must give advance
warning of permanent checkpoints,219 motorists are fully aware of
permanent checkpoint locations.220 Experienced officials select the
checkpoint locations to promote efficiency and save law enforcement
resources.221 The Court suggested that permanent checkpoints provide 
clarity and leave less room for agents to abuse or harass individuals during
these stops.222 Notably, the Court determined that permanent traffic stops 
advance Fourth Amendment interests by minimizing the intrusion on the
general motoring public.223 
The Martinez-Fuerte Court also identified a number of factors that
contribute to the reasonableness of suspicionless searches at permanent
traffic stops.224 Indeed, the Court recognized that permanent stops are 
reasonable because they are brief, routine, and minimally intrusive.225 
Moreover, permanent checkpoints provide more predictability because
individuals receive some notice of checkpoint locations and understand
that exterior inspections of their cars may occur.226 Additionally, travelers
expect to answer questions regarding their nationality or immigration
status when driving through a permanent checkpoint.227 This increased 
likelihood of reasonableness arises because permanent checkpoints
operate under detailed rules that limit agent discretion.228 For example,
agents can only stop cars passing through the checkpoint and minimally
question each individual.229 Additionally, border agents cannot search a
217. Id. at 566.
218. Id. at 558.
219. What Are the Search and Seizure Rules at Permanent Interior
Immigration Checkpoints?, supra note 208 (noting that the government must use 
signs, cones, or flashing lights to warn drivers of an upcoming permanent
checkpoint).
220. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 559.
221. Id.
222. Id. at 560.
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. See id. at 555.
226. Id. at 558.
227. Id.
228. See generally id. at 555.
229. Id. at 558.
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2292019] COMMENT
vehicle’s contents or the person without probable cause.230 As a result, 
agents follow structured procedure, leaving less room for harassment or
agent abuse.231 Because stipulated rules and procedures constrain border
agents’ actions when conducting a search, permanent checkpoints
“minimally intrude” on the general public.232 
Because digital forensic searches at the border and permanent traffic
stops aim to achieve similar goals, courts evaluating the reasonableness of
forensic searches at the border should follow the Martinez-FuerteCourt.233 
That is, situations involving limited agent discretion and heightened
predictability increases the likelihood that a forensic search at the border
is reasonable.234 Examining the potential effect a suspicionless digital
forensic search at the border may have on agent discretion and
predictability will clarify the impact of the Cotterman, Kolsuz, and Touset
decisions on the reasonableness of forensic search procedure.
Removing a reasonable suspicion standard to conduct digital forensic
searches would eliminate a primary tool used to monitor searches at the
border.235 Under Touset’s ruling, suspicionless searches provide agents
ample discretion.236 Instead of narrowing forensic searches to possible bad
actors, Touset’s holding has the potential to intrude on the general public’s
privacy interests.237 In the absence of a suspicion requirement, border
230. See Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266 (1973).
231. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 560.
232. Theodore Levitt, an academic at Harvard Business School, has described
employee discretion “as the enemy of order, standardization, and equality.”
THEODORE LEVITT, MARKETING FOR BUSINESS GROWTH 56 (1974). Levitt
suggested employee discretion is controlled by employee motivation,
organizational commitment, knowledge, and mood states. Id. He suggested that 
procedures that increase employee motivation and happiness lead to less deviant
behavior. Id. Therefore, establishing policies that promote positivity and
understanding at the border may control agent discretion. See Scott W. Kelley,
Discretion and the Service Employee, U. KY. J. RETAILING (1993).
233. See Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 554 (defining the purpose of permanent
traffic stops); KIM, supra note 11, at 1 (defining the purpose of the border-search
exception).
234. See generally Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 558.
235. See generally Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Predictive Policing and
Reasonable Suspicion, 62 EMORY L.J. 259 (2012).
236. Because agents do not have to articulate specific facts or circumstances
to conduct a search, agents’ discretion can go unchecked. See generally id.
237. CBP Search Authority, supra note 203 (emphasizing that even with
targeting techniques, agent suspicion is sometimes unfounded).
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230 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80
agents need no justification for conducting a forensic search.238 The 
Martinez-Fuerte Court specifically discouraged this type of intrusion.239 
This unfettered agent discretion creates more room for incidental or
intentional harassment.240 Additionally, crossing the border inconveniences
individuals because they do not know if they will be forensically searched,
what information will be accessed, the duration of the search, or when their
devices will be returned.241 Lacking this information could result in 
unexpected missed flights or other aggravations. In short, suspicionless
digital forensic searches create vast unpredictability.242 Applying the
reasonableness factors from Martinez-Fuerte, it appears suspicionless
forensic searches could lead to unconstrained agent discretion, making
searches less reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.
Under Cotterman and Kolsuz’s reasoning, requiring reasonable
suspicion creates more predictability in the border search context.243 
Border entrants are informed why they are subjected to a forensic search, 
which may give them a better understanding of what content will be 
revealed during the search and what questions they will be asked.244 
Additionally, innocent border entrants are confident that agents will not
unreasonably search their devices because border agents must provide
238. See generally United States v. Touset, 890 F.3d 1227, 1230 (11th Cir.
2018).
239. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 560.
240. See generally Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 558.
241. Because the public is not warned of the potential inconvenience, and
agents do not need to articulate why they are forensically searching an
individual’s electronic devices, information is not readily available. See supra
Section III.A.2.
242. Written rules and regulations give employees little autonomy. Procedure
makes employee behavior more predictable because employees respond to
problems in similar ways across the organization, which leads to consistency and
efficiency. Consequently, unpredictability leaves more opportunity for
inconsistency. See generally MASON CARPENTER ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF
MANAGEMENT (2012).
243. See United States v. Kolsuz, 890 F.3d 133, 147 (4th Cir. 2018) (holding
that agents must have reasonable suspicion to conduct a digital forensic search at
the border). Because reasonable suspicion requires agents to articulate specific 
facts and circumstances for conducting a search, border entrants are provided with
more information, which makes the detention and search of entrants’ devices
more predictable. See generally id.
244. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (stating that because reasonable
suspicion requires officers to describe a specific set of circumstances that would
lead any objectively reasonable law enforcement officer to suspect the individual
is engaged in criminal activity, there is more information available).
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2312019] COMMENT
justification for searches or seizures.245 Parsing prior caselaw, limiting
agent discretion by procedure or a reasonable search requirement appears
to decrease unreasonable searches.246 When evaluating the reasonableness
of the procedure used to implement a forensic search, courts should also
consider the state’s interest in preventing certain types of harm.
C. Public Safety and Reasonable Forensic Searches
Courts often consider public safety when evaluating the reasonableness
of a suspicionless search or seizure.247 When assessing the reasonableness
of digital forensic searches at the border, courts should inquire as to the kind,
degree, and imminence of harm the state aims to prevent.248 If the digital
forensic search at the border was unnecessary to prevent the type of harm at
stake, the search should be deemed less reasonable.249 
In Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’ Association, the Supreme
Court ruled that suspicionless searches do not violate the Fourth
Amendment when law enforcement needs to render probable cause and 
warrant requirements impracticable.250 In Skinner, a railway association
filed suit to challenge the constitutionality of suspicionless employee
alcohol and drug tests.251 The Court considered the risks railroad operations
pose and concluded that suspicionless drug tests of railroad employees are
reasonable because the government has a strong public safety interest in
regulating railroad employees’ conduct.252 Furthermore, “one undetected
instance of wrongdoing could have injurious consequences for a great
number of people . . . [and] even one drug-or alcohol-impaired train
operator can lead to the ‘disastrous consequences’ of a train wreck.”253 The 
Court also acknowledged that if a reasonable suspicion requirement would
not place the government’s objectives in jeopardy, the requirement should
245. See generally id. at 1.
246. See United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 555 (1976) (listing factors
that contribute to a reasonable suspicionless search at the border).
247. See Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989).
248. See generally id. at 634 (noting that the type and imminence of harm at
stake are critical factors in making suspicionless searches reasonable).
249. See id. at 602.
250. Id.
251. Id. at 607.
252. Id. at 620.
253. “Blanket” of “General” Suspicionless Searches Held Intolerable and
Unreasonable, LAWREADER (Dec. 31, 2016), https://lawreader.com/?p=172
91#BORDERDETENTION [https://perma.cc/TVM3-7FA7] (quoting Nat’l 
Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 670 (1989)).
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232 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80
stand.254 The government was therefore justified in implementing the drug
tests without suspicion because it sought to prevent intoxicated railway
operators from causing serious harm.255 
Courts disagree on the types of public safety concerns that validate a
suspicionless search.256 Although Congress primarily created the CBP to
protect society from terrorist threats, courts have ruled that a general threat
of terrorism, as opposed to a specific threat, cannot justify a suspicionless
search or seizure.257 In Bourgeois v. Peters, a city instituted a policy
mandating individuals engaged in annual protests on public property to
submit to a search before entering the protest area.258 The court reasoned
that a general threat of terrorism cannot justify a suspicionless search.259 
According to the Eleventh Circuit, the city could not subject innocent people
who show no indication of possessing contraband or weapons to a search.260 
Additionally, the court reasoned that “a search intended to enforce a given
law would be permissible so long as the government officially maintained
that its purpose was to secure the objectives that motivated the law’s
enactment in the first place (e.g., public safety) . . . .”261 Because the degree
of harm is minimal absent a definite, imminent threat of terrorism, citizens’
right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures outweighs the
government’s interests in national security.262 
The Bourgeois court did not discuss airport or border searches, but,
months later, a New York federal district court in Stauber v. City of New 
York differentiated between security threats at populous protests and
airports.263 The Stauber court emphasized that, unlike a “general
invocation of terrorist threats,” airport searches are “implemented in
254. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 624.
255. See id. at 602.
256. See Bourgeois v. Peters, 387 F.3d 1303, 1307 (11th Cir. 2004); Stauber
v. City of New York, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13350, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. July 19,
2004).
257. Preventing Terrorism Overview, HOMELAND SEC., https://www.dhs.gov/
topic/preventing-terrorism [https://perma.cc/GY5X-R6HC] (last visited Oct. 13,
2018); see Bourgeois, 387 F.3d 1303.
258. Bourgeois, 387 F.3d at 1307. The search was similar to airport screening:
each person had to walk through a metal detector.
259. Id. at 1316.
260. Id. at 1311.
261. Id. at 1313.
262. Id. at 1311. If searches were justified by general threats of terrorism, the
government could conduct suspicionless searches at almost any large event. Id.
263. Stauber v. City of New York, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13350, at *3
(S.D.N.Y. July 19, 2004).
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2332019] COMMENT
response to specific information about the threats faced by officials.”264 As
a result, CBP agents must respond to real and concrete threats at
airports.265 Absent reasonable suspicion, forensic searches at the border
mirror a tool used to combat general terrorism more than an enforcement
tool used to contest specific threats—a situation the court deemed
unreasonable in Bourgeois. By engaging in risk assessment and
identifying specific threats at the border prior to conducing a forensic
search, government agents ensure their actions comply with the Fourth
Amendment.
1. Clarifying the Meaning of “Reasonable Suspicion” in the Public 
Safety Context
By considering public safety in a Fourth Amendment reasonableness
analysis, courts can provide clarity to the abstract concept of reasonable
suspicion in the border search context. Neither Cotterman nor Kolsuz
clarified if the relevant question for courts is: (1) whether CBP agents had
reasonable suspicion that evidence was presently on the digital device they
seized; or (2) whether the CBP agents had reasonable suspicion to believe
the digital device’s owner was currently engaged in criminal activity at the 
border.266 If the government is aiming to prevent digital contraband from
entering the state, the proper inquiry should be the former: whether CBP
agents had reasonable suspicion that contraband was on the digital device
itself.267 Otherwise, anyone could simply ship their devices or give them
to a third party to avoid a border search.268 Under this reasoning, a digital
forensic search conducted in response to suspicion that an individual is
engaged in child pornography would be more reasonable than a digital
forensic search conducted on someone who is caught smuggling, for
example, illegal cigarettes. Consequently, courts must determine if CBP
agents gathered sufficient facts to believe an individual posed a danger to
264. Id. at *83–84.
265. Id.
266. United States v. Cotterman, 709 F.3d 952, 966 (9th Cir. 2013); United
States v. Kolsuz, 890 F.3d 133, 147 (4th Cir. 2018).
267. Orin Kerr, Every Computer Border Search Requires Case-by-Case 
Reasonableness, DC Court Holds, WASH. POST (Mar. 12, 2015), https://www. 
washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2015/05/12/every-computer-
border-search-requires-case-by-case-reasonableness-dc-court-holds/?utm_term=
.6feb512e87d1 [https://perma.cc/RP97-AH4M].
268. Id.
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234 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80
society and to evaluate if the specific digital forensic search was necessary
to stop the harm at risk.269 
2. The Circuit Split’s Impact on Public Safety
Under Cotterman and Kolsuz’s rulings that digital forensic searches
require reasonable suspicion, courts must decipher the kind and degree of
harm that the CBP was attempting to prevent when conducting the search.
For example, if an agent receives notice that the government is
investigating an individual for child pornography, his search is more likely
to be reasonable because it intends to prevent a serious harm.270 
On the contrary, if an agent conducts a digital forensic search without
suspicion, the agent may be unaware of the kind and degree of harm, if
any, he is trying to prevent.271 Furthermore, the government may be able
to prevent that harm by performing less invasive searches. In short,
conducing forensic searches on individuals who present no risk or threat
abuses the purpose of the border search exception and leads to
unreasonable government surveillance.272 
269. The first inquiry into the proposed public safety test is equivalent to
reasonable suspicion. Reasonable suspicion is “a particularized and objective
basis for suspecting the particular person” of wrongdoing. United States v.
Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 541, 541 (1985) (citing United States v. Cortez,
449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981)).
270. A violation of a federal child pornography law is a serious crime, and
convicted offenders serve years in prison. Citizen’s Guide to U.S. Federal Law on
Child Pornography, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., https://www.justice.gov/criminal-
ceos/citizens-guide-us-federal-law-child-pornography [https://perma.cc/3KWW-
6N2T] (last updated December 12, 2017). Digital forensic searches for this
purpose seek to prevent severe abusive and sexual harm to minors. Id.
271. Without suspicion, there may not be articulated facts or circumstances to
identify what contraband the government is seeking.
272. Border searches are considered administrative searches, or searches that
are carried out to enforce compliance with regulations or laws pertaining to
security or health. See People v. Madison, 520 N.E.2d 374 (Ill. 1988). The 
government may not use an administrative inspection to search for evidence of
criminal violations. Id. A suspicionless forensic search of an individual’s
electronic device could potentially transform into a tool used to generally fight
crime, instead of a tool used to prevent contraband from entering the United
States. See generally id.
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2352019] COMMENT
D. Policy Considerations
Suspicionless digital forensic searches at the border have wide-
ranging consequences in other areas of the law, as well as to the economy
as a whole, that CBP must take into account.273 In particular, suspicionless
searches often affect claims of intentional discrimination under the equal
protection clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments and result in
CBP resource depletion.274 
1. The Circuit Split’s Impact on Equal Protection
As the government passes new laws and regulations to monitor
immigration and foreign travel, border security intensifies, and searches
of electronic devices at the border continue to escalate.275 Disagreement
on the handling of race relations and immigration persists.276 If CBP agents
do not need any suspicion to conduct a digital forensic search as stipulated
273. See generally Janfeshan v. United States Customs & Border Prot., No. 
16-CV-6915(ARR)(LB), 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 151058 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 21,
2017).
274. Title VI Legal Manual–Section VI: Proving Discrimination–Intentional
Discrimination, U.S. DEP’T JUST., https://www.justice.gov/crt/fcs/T6Manual6
[https://perma.cc/7Q29-4X7S] (last updated Feb. 10, 2017) (“[A] discriminatory
intent claim alleges that a recipient intentionally treated persons differently or
otherwise knowingly caused them harm because of their race, color, or national
origin.”). The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments seek to limit the power of the
government to discriminate. The Fifth Amendment explicitly requires the federal
government not to deprive individuals of life, liberty, or property without due
process of law and contains a guarantee that each person receives equal protection
of the laws. U.S. CONST. amend. V. Similarly, the Fourteenth Amendment
prohibits states from depriving citizens of due process or equal protection. U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV.
275. See President Donald J. Trump’s Administration Is Working to Build
Stronger Borders, WHITE HOUSE (Mar. 13, 2018), https://www.whitehouse.gov
/briefings-statements/president-donald-j-trumps-administration-working-build-
stronger-borders/ [https://perma.cc/DJ2K-FTY9].
276. Anthony Salvanto, Poll: One Year After Charlottesville, Majority of 
Americans See Racial Tensions on the Rise, CBS NEWS (Aug. 12, 2018), https://
www.cbsnews.com/news/poll-one-year-after-charlottesville-americans-see-racial-
tensions-on-increase/ [https://perma.cc/TH6T-EZVX] (finding 61% of Americans
believe racial tensions have increased in the last year and 58% of Americans
disagree with President Trump’s handling of racial issues).
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236 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80
in Touset, they may forensically search a person’s devices solely on the
basis of their ethnicity, nationality, or background.277 
In addition to criminal lawsuits, private parties are beginning to
challenge the constitutionality of digital forensic searches in civil suits.
Recently, courts have confronted intentional discrimination and selective
enforcement claims involving digital forensic searches at the border.278 In
November of 2016, Hemad Janfeshan, a lawful permanent resident of the
United States, arrived at Kennedy International Airport in New York after
traveling abroad in Egypt and Yemen for 16 months with his wife and
children.279 After deplaning, CBP agents apprehended Janfeshan to obtain 
information about his travels and escorted him to a separate room to
conduct a full body search.280 After consistently asking Janfeshan about
his religion, the agents asked for Janfeshan’s passcode to his
smartphone.281 Janfeshan refused to reveal his passcode, alleging that he 
had confidential information protected by attorney-client privilege on his
device.282 Instead of conducting a manual search, the agents retained his 
smartphone for six weeks and conducted a forensic examination of its
contents.283 Janfeshan filed suit and alleged a violation of his Fourth and
277. The Transportation Security Agency (TSA) is a branch of the DHS that 
controls the security of the traveling public in the United States. TSA documents
reveal a disproportionate focus on or bias against Muslims, Arabs, and people of
Middle Eastern decent. Hugh Handeyside, New Documents Show This TSA
Program Blamed for Profiling Is Unscientifc and Unreliable – But Still It
Continues, ACLU (Feb. 8, 2017, 11:45 AM), https://www.aclu.org/blog/national-
security/discriminatory-profiling/new-documents-show-tsa-program-blamed-pro
filing [https://perma.cc/4Z5V-3KCU]. Further, records of investigations into
alleged profiling behavior by TSA detection officers revealed that many officers
refer minority passengers for additional screening more than others. Id. Giving
CBP agents discretion to search individuals without justification could lead to
implicit prejudice. Agents may unintentionally discriminate based on
subconscious ideas and associations. See generally Calvin K. Lai et al., Reducing
Implicit Prejudice, 7 SOC. & PERSONALITY PSYCHOL. COMPASS 315 (2013).
278. See Janfeshan, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 151058.
279. Id. at *2–3.
280. Id. at *3.
281. Id. at *4.
282. Id. The border agents told Janfeshan that if he gave the agents his
passcode, they would be able to conduct a forensic search that day and he would
be able to take his phone home. Id. Because Janfeshan refused to provide the
confidential information to access his device, the agents retained his phone for
two weeks. Id.
283. Id. The technology used to forensically search devices does not require
the suspect’s passcode to effectively conduct the search. See generally Forensic
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2372019] COMMENT
Fifth Amendment rights.284 Specifically, Janfeshan alleged the agents
questioned him and forensically searched his phone because he was a 
Muslim of Afghan origin.285 
The district court judge concluded that Janfeshan adequately pleaded
a Fifth Amendment intentional discrimination claim, articulating that “it
is reasonable to infer from the agent’s focus on Janfeshan’s faith and
national origin in his questioning that he subjected Janfeshan to extensive
questioning and then decided to seize and search his phone at least in part
because of those protected characteristics.”286 Janfeshan’s case survived 
an early motion to dismiss, revealing that the court recognized unfettered 
agent discretion of digital forensic searches could lead to unreasonable and
prejudiced searches.287As Janfeshan illustrates, intentional discrimination
at the border posed a problem even before Touset’s ruling.288 Allowing
law enforcement officers to conduct forensic searches at the border
without any suspicion only justifies and encourages discriminatory 
behavior similar to Janfeshan. Furthermore, freely permitting
suspicionless forensic searches puts CBP resources at stake.
2. The Circuit Split’s Impact on CBP Resource Optimization
A structured reasonableness test could serve to alleviate the stress on
CBP resources.289 In 2015 and 2016, CBP agents processed more than 380 
million arriving travelers.290 To accommodate these numbers, the CBP
needs to increase agents. Nonetheless, border patrol staffing has steadily
declined since 2011.291 According to the Government Accountability
Examination of Digital Devices in Civil Litigation: The Legal, Ethical and
Technical Traps, ABA (June 14, 2017), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/
professional_responsibility/publications/professional_lawyer/2016/volume-24-
number-1/forensic_examination_digital_devices_civil_litigation_legal_ethical_
and_technical_traps/ [https://perma.cc/8HFC-KNTM]. Because Janfeshan
refused to relinquish his passcode for the manual search, the border agents
conducted the forensic search. See Janfeshan, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 151058.
284. See Janfeshan, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 151058, at *11.
285. Id. at *25.
286. Id. at *27–28.
287. See id.
288. Janfeshan was filed before Touset was decided. See id.
289. Gasior, supra note 200.
290. Patrick G. Lee, What Customs and Border Officials Can and Can’t Do, 
PAC. STANDARD (Mar. 13, 2017), https://psmag.com/news/what-customs-and-
border-officials-can-and-cant-do [https://perma.cc/6CHF-A6RS].
291. Border Patrol Agent Nationwide Staffing by Fiscal Year, U.S. BORDER
PATROL, https://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/assets/documents/2017-Dec/BP
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238 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80
Office report, CBP was more than 1,100 officers short in 2017 due to
competition and attrition.292 
Political leaders are aware of CBP’s lack and misuse of resources.293 
Representative Bennie Thompson, a democratic member of the House
Homeland Security Committee, stated that “if CBP was able to prioritize
the staffing and infrastructure of our border, we would be able to better
process individuals at the border.”294 Additionally, this lack of resources 
has led to overworked CBP employees, which negatively impacts agent
behavior and leads to deviant discretion.295 
Thus, in a time of dwindling CBP capacity, effective procedure
limiting agent discretion can create predictable resource management.296 
Forensic searches are more costly and time-consuming than manual
searches,297 and border patrol does not have the capability to conduct
meaningless digital forensic searches.298 By eliminating the need for CBP 
agents to justify their forensic searches at the border, agents may
forensically search innocent civilians, which leads to inefficiency and
frivolous searches.299 
%20Staffing%20FY1992-FY2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/XHX3-YUSX] (last
updated Dec.12, 2017).
292. CBP faced challenges deploying agents because of these staffing
shortages. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-17-618, CUSTOMS AND
BORDER PROTECTION: IMPROVED PLANNING NEEDED TO STRENGTHEN TRADE
ENFORCEMENT (2017). In 2017, the CBP did not meet its authorized staffing
levels for its trade positions. Id.
293. Joe Davidson, Immigration Cop Shortage and a Caution Against Hiring
Too Quickly, WASH. POST (July 23, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
news/powerpost/wp/2018/07/23/immigration-cop-shortage-a-caution-against-hir
ing-too-quickly/?utm_term=.08173e4effce [https://perma.cc/GF8J-27GT].
294. Id.
295. Discretion and the Service Employee, U.KY. J. RETAILING (1993) (stating 
that employee discretion is controlled by employee motivation, organizational
commitment, knowledge, and mood states); Davidson, supra note 293.
296. See infra Part IV.
297. See United States v. Saboonchi, 990 F. Supp. 2d 536, 547 (D. Md. 2014).
298. See Davidson, supra note 293.
299. CBP Search Authority, supra note 203 (explaining that agents use 
techniques such as technology to track suspicious activity). Without a requirement 
of suspicion, agents do not rely on facts to forensically search an individual. Id.
Instead, agents rely on their own discretion. Id. This reliance leaves ample room
for mistakes. 
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2392019] COMMENT
Hiring more CBP agents appears to be the best solution to CBP’s
resource problem.300 A 2017 American Immigration Council301 report, 
however, stated that “the last time the Border Patrol received a large
infusion of money to hire thousands of new agents, cases of corruption and
misconduct spiked in the agency. New hires were not sufficiently vetted,
novice agents were not adequately supervised, and agents who abused 
their authority acted with impunity.”302 Consequently, if CBP hires more
border agents to account for the increase in comprehensive searches, the
possibility of misconduct and corruption would also increase.303 This
potential for misconduct is even more alarming in the forensic search
context due to the sensitive nature of the information accessed during a
forensic analysis.304 The unpredictability associated with creating
suspicionless forensic searches in a time of advancing technology could
lead to larger problems, such as discrimination.305 For these reasons, courts
should analyze the impact that procedure has on resource optimization
when considering the reasonableness of a digital forensic search at the
border. 
IV. CLEARLY DEFINING REASONABLE DIGITAL FORENSIC SEARCHES
Whether digital forensic searches are implemented through reasonable
suspicion of criminal activity or no suspicion at all, they must pass the
Fourth Amendment’s general test of reasonableness.306 Reasonableness— 
the “touchstone of the constitutionality of a governmental search”— 
300. Davidson, supra note 293.
301. The American Immigration Council is a non-profit that collects facts and
statistics to educate the public on immigration in America. The American
Immigration Council frequently reports on the effects of immigration policies.
About the American Immigration Council, AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL, https://www
.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/about/our-mission [https://perma.cc/CD23-27
24] (last visited Oct. 26, 2018).
302. Davidson, supra note 293.
303. Between 2006 and 2009, CBP hired 8,000 new agents. Josiah Heyman,
Why Caution Is Needed Before Hiring Additional Border Patrol Agents and ICE
Officers, AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL (Apr. 24, 2017); Davidson, supra note 293. The 
number of CBP employees arrested for misconduct increased 44% between 2007
and 2012. Id.
304. United States v. Saboonchi, 990 F. Supp. 2d 536, 548 (D. Md. 2014).
305. See Janfeshan v. United States Customs & Border Prot., No. 16-CV-
6915(ARR)(LB), 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 151058, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 21, 2017).
306. See generally U.S. CONST. amend. IV (protecting individuals from
unreasonable searches and seizures).
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240 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80
depends on the totality of circumstances.307 Generally, reasonableness
involves balancing the need for a search against an individual’s reasonable
privacy interests.308 This standard, however, has proven impractical and
has led to inconsistent law for digital forensic border searches.309 Although
courts must interpret reasonableness in light of established Fourth
Amendment principles, the constitutionality of digital forensic searches
has been determined by courts’ personal opinions about the governmental
and privacy interests at stake.310 
A solution to the nation’s conflicting law involving digital forensic
searches at the border lies in a principled multi-factor reasonableness test,
which courts should apply on a case-by-case basis. Using this test, courts
should analyze the reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment by
balancing the duration and procedure of the search with the harms that the
state aims to prevent by conducting the search. In turn, CBP discretion will
be limited, minimizing the likelihood of intentional discrimination and
selective enforcement at the border. Further, CBP resources will be
efficiently distributed. A more structured reasonableness test will make
the criteria for evaluating digital forensic searches more predictable and
place a limitation on court and agent discretion.311 
A. Duration
The first factor courts should consider involves examining the
duration of the digital forensic search.312 In analyzing duration, courts
should focus on CBP agent behavior during the detention of the border
entrant’s electronic devices. Particularly, analyzing agents’ due diligence
in pursuing the forensic search, reviewing the quality of information given
to the suspect, and considering the number of agents available to conduct
the forensic search during the detention period will advise courts on the
reasonableness of the search’s duration.313 
307. See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 828 (2002).
308. KIM, supra note 11.
309. See generally United States v. Cotterman, 637 F.3d 1068 (9th Cir. 2011);
United States v. Touset, 890 F.3d 1227 (11th Cir. 2018); United States v. Kolsuz,
890 F.3d 133 (4th Cir. 2018).
310. Bourgeois v. Peters, 387 F.3d 1303, 1313 (11th Cir. 2004).
311. The multi-factor reasonableness test is illustrative. Other factors may be 
considered, especially in light of the scope of the forensic search.
312. Supra Section II.A.
313. Supra Section II.A.
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2412019] COMMENT
Due diligence refers to “earnest and persistent application to
accomplish something.”314 An agent acts diligently in a forensic search
when he or she exercises reasonable care to avoid harm to the individual
or their property.315 CBP agents diligently pursuing a forensic search
should arrange their investigation to minimize the intrusion on an
individual’s Fourth Amendment interests.316 Indeed, agents acting with 
diligence plan their courses of action and pursue it with great attention and
vigor.317 Agents failing to exercise due diligence unnecessarily prolong 
forensic searches or may damage electronic devices due to their
carelessness or negligence.318 For example, the agent who forensically
searched Mr. Alasaad’s phone in Alasaad v. Nielson did not act with due
diligence because the agent’s search destroyed Mr. Alassad’s graduation
video. In this instance, the agent conducted a less-reasonable search of Mr.
Alasaad’s phone.319 
Moreover, a forensic search is more reasonable when CBP agents give
the suspect quality information regarding the duration and purpose of the
search.320 An agent’s failure to inform the suspect where they are taking
the electronic devices, how long they are keeping the devices, and how
they will return the devices exacerbates an unreasonable search.321 Quality 
information establishes predictability, which creates less inconvenience
for suspects.322 In the Alasaads’ case, the officers did not inform the 
Alasaads why they were being searched or precisely how long the search
would take.323 Under these circumstances, the search was more 
unreasonable because the agents subjected the Alasaads to a disruption in
their travel plans without any indication of whether to wait for their phones
or leave them behind.324 
314. Diligence Law and Legal Definition, US LEGAL, https://definitions.usle
gal.com/d/diligence/ [https://perma.cc/DTC2-BHST] (last visited Oct. 14, 2018).
315. Id.
316. See generally United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983) (describing a
disorganized plan to search as a lack of agent diligence).
317. Id.
318. See generally id. (describing an unnecessarily prolonged search as
unreasonable because the agents failed to act diligently).
319. See id.
320. Supra Section III.A.2.
321. Supra Section III.A.2.
322. Supra Section III.A.2.
323. Alasaad v. Nielson, No. 17-CV-11730-DJC, 2018 WL 2170323, at *5 (D. 
Mass. May 19, 2018).
324. See generally id.
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242 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80
Courts should also consider the number of CBP agents available to
conduct the search.325 In many instances, there are a limited number of
agents certified in computer forensics, thus requiring more time for agents 
to forensically search devices.326 If the government produces evidence that
the limited number of available agents caused the search duration to be 
more prolonged, courts may deem the forensic search more reasonable.327 
On the contrary, if the government fails to show a relationship between the 
limited number of agents and the duration of the search, the search is more
likely unreasonable.328 
Lastly, criminal defendants may present expert testimony from a
forensic investigator suggesting the unreasonableness of a given search.329 
An expert’s specialized opinion can clarify whether agents acted diligently
or whether the number of available agents reasonably prolonged a search.
Taking agent diligence, quality information, and the number of available
agents into account, courts will analyze the reasonableness of the duration
of a forensic search fairly, consistently, and lawfully. 
B. Procedure
When determining a search’s reasonableness, courts should also
analyze the procedure used to implement and conduct the digital forensic
search.330 Focusing on agent discretion, predictability, and resource
optimization will direct courts’ attention to the reasonable or unreasonable
execution of a digital forensic search.331 
Discretion is a key component to border enforcement. Courts should
evaluate agents’ vigilance in deciding what and whose devices to
forensically search332 because unfettered discretion may lead to
harassment or agent abuse during digital forensic searches.333 Some
discretion, however, is unavoidable because the law cannot anticipate
325. See House v. Napolitano, No. 11-10852-DJC, 2012 WL 1038816 (D.
Mass. Mar. 28, 2012) (stating that the number of agents available during a search 
affects the reasonableness of the search).
326. Id.
327. Supra Section III.A.2.
328. Supra Section III.A.2.
329. House v. Napolitano, No. 11-10852-DJC, 2012 WL 1038816, at *9 (D.
Mass. Mar. 28, 2012) (presenting defendant’s expert testimony that showed the
duration of the search was unreasonable under the circumstances).
330. Supra Section II.B.
331. Supra Section II.B.
332. Levitt, supra note 232.
333. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 555, 560 (1976).
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2432019] COMMENT
every event at the border.334 Forensic searches take longer, are less routine, 
and are more intrusive than permanent checkpoints.335 Consequently,
society must trust competent agents to exercise discretion to avoid
prejudice or inequality.336 CBP agents should make similar decisions in
similar cases to prevent disparity in the law.337 Nevertheless, agents
sometimes intentionally or inadvertently abuse their discretion and
needlessly infringe an individual’s rights.338 To illustrate, if CBP agents
use their discretion to target individuals based on nationality or conduct a
forensic search simply because “they feel like it,” courts should find the
search unreasonable.339 Courts should consider how and why CBP agents
conducted a digital forensic search on a case-by-case basis to legitimize 
the reasonableness of the forensic search.340 
Moreover, CBP could use systematic sampling341 or other probability
methods to limit agent discretion at the border.342 Systematic sampling is
a type of probability sampling method by which members of a population
are selected according to a random starting point but with a fixed, periodic
interval.343 Using this sampling method allows each person crossing
international borders to have a known and equal probability of selection.
In sum, predictable digital forensic searches are more reasonable.344 
Policies and procedures create certainty and put people on notice of the
possibility of a forensic search.345 Notice reduces travelers’ expectations
of privacy, which would therefore make a forensic search more 
334. Jon Roland, Abuse of Judicial Discretion, CONST. SOC’Y, http://www
.constitution.org/abus/discretion/judicial/judicial_discretion.htm [https://perma.c
c/TL92-GNZJ] (last visited Oct. 14, 2018).
335. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 555.
336. Roland, supra note 334.
337. Id.
338. See, e.g., Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 560.
339. Targeting based on nationality may lead to intentional discrimination or
selective enforcement, both of which violate the equal protection clauses of the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV.
340. Supra Section III.B.
341. Adam Hayes, Systematic Sampling, INVESTOPEDIA (Mar. 20, 2019),
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/s/systematic-sampling.asp [https://perma.cc/
PQC7-3MYX]. 
342. An agent could derogate from the systematic sampling method if he forms
reasonable suspicion to forensically search an individual’s digital device. See 
generally id.
343. Id.
344. See, e.g., Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 560 (holding predictability limits
agent discretion).
345. Gasior, supra note 200.
337366-LSU_80-1_Text.indd  250 11/27/19  9:29 AM
   
 
 
 
   
  
  
    
  
    
  
  
   
   
  
    
  
  
  
     
  
   
 
   
     
  
   
 
     
    
    
      
     
 
    
    
  
 
    
   
        
 
    
 
  
244 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80
reasonable.346 Courts should determine the border entrant’s expectation of
privacy and the notice provided to the entrant before he or she crossed the
border.347 Using these considerations, travelers would be protected from
unconstitutional or frivolous searches and seizures at the border. 
C. Harms at Stake
Courts should lastly consider public safety through a multi-factor
reasonableness analysis 348 that analyzes the kind, degree, and imminency
of harm the state is trying to prevent with the search.349 The more
important the harms at stake, the more likely the court should find the
resultant searches reasonable.350 
An ideal public safety analysis occurs in two steps. First, courts would
determine if CBP agents gathered facts to believe an individual posed a
danger to society.351 Second, courts would evaluate whether the digital
forensic search was necessary to stop the harm at risk. In many cases,
manual searches can prevent certain harms.352 For example, a digital
forensic search of an individual that the government suspects is bringing
batteries or knitting needles onto an airplane may not be necessary to
prevent harm. On the other hand, a digital forensic search of an individual
suspected of internet fraud or identity theft would likely be reasonable
considering the location of possible incriminating evidence.353 
Using the foregoing factors, a digital forensic search at the border is
more likely to be reasonable under Cotterman and Kolsuz’s rulings. Even 
a suspicionless forensic search, however, must meet the Fourth
346. See generally KIM, supra note 11.
347. Supra Section III.B.
348. Supra Section III.C.
349. See Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989) (holding
suspicionless drug tests of railroad operators were necessary and reasonable to
protect the public).
350. Supra Section III.C.
351. The first step to the proposed public safety analysis is equivalent to
reasonable suspicion. Reasonable suspicion is “a particularized and objective
basis for suspecting the particular person” of wrongdoing. United States v.
Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 541, 541 (1985) (citing United States v. Cortez,
449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981)).
352. See generally United States v. Saboonchi, 990 F. Supp. 2d 536, 552 (D.
Md. 2014).
353. Scams and Safety: Internet Fraud , FED. BUREAU INVESTIGATION, 
https://www.fbi.gov/scams-and-safety/common-fraud-schemes/internet-fraud 
[https://perma.cc/6DJT-RMWU] (last visited Oct. 27, 2018).
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Amendment’s long-standing reasonableness requirement.354 Courts
should use this test even under Touset’s ruling to reduce prejudiced border
enforcement. It is crucial that courts have some mechanism to prevent
race, nationality, and other socioeconomic characteristics from affecting
the execution of forensic searches.355 A structured reasonableness test
gives courts a tool to eliminate potential discrimination caused by implicit
or explicit agent bias.356 Furthermore, limiting agent discretion will ensure
the efficient use of CBP resources.357 
CONCLUSION
Adopting a structured multi-factor reasonableness test to determine
the reasonableness of a digital forensic search under the Fourth
Amendment will provide redress to individuals and families, such as the
Alasaads.358 In a time at which digital searches at the nation’s border are
increasing,359 courts and agents need principled guidance to salvage Fourth
Amendment protections in a technology-driven society.360 Courts should
use a principled test to analyze the reasonableness of digital forensic
searches.361 Agent diligence, the quality of information available, and
resource optimization are just a few of many specific factors courts can
use to accurately and fairly analyze the reasonableness of digital forensic
searches at the border.362 By using this test, courts will provide a principled
distinction between reasonable and unreasonable digital forensic searches,
delivering clarity to a part of the Fourth Amendment search and seizure
analysis that courts have overlooked for some time.363 
354. See generally U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
355. Supra Section III.D.1.
356. Supra Section III.C.2.
357. Supra Section III.D.2.
358. Alasaad v. Nielson, No. 17-CV-11730-DJC, 2018 WL 2170323, at *5 (D. 
Mass. May 19, 2018).
359. Currie et al., supra note 23.
360. Karehka Ramey, Technology and Society – Impact of Technology on
Society, TECHUCATION (Nov. 12, 2012), https://www.useoftechnology.com/tech
nology-society-impact-technology-society/ [https://perma.cc/JXB9-FDCH].
361. Supra Part III.
362. See United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 710 (1983) (considering agent
diligence and the quality of information available to the border entrant as factors
contributing to the reasonableness of a search).
363. Supra Section III.B.
